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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
MDG   Millennium Development Goals 
IDP   Integrated Development Model Village 
Umuganda Traditional practice in Rwanda; ‘coming together in common purpose to 
achieve an outcome’ 
Imihigo  Traditional practice in Rwanda; translates to ‘vow to deliver’ 
Ubudehe Traditional practice in Rwanda; translates to ‘collective action and mutual 
support’ 
Girinka  Traditional practice in Rwanda; translates to ‘may you have a cow’ 
MINALOC  Ministry of Local Government 
MININFRA  Ministry of Infrastructure 
RHA   Rwanda Housing Authority 
Umudugudu Village (singular); the lowest level of government, often used 
interchangeably as the Rural Resettlement Program 
Imidugudu Village (plural); the lowest level of government, often used 
interchangeably as the plural form of the Rural Resettlement Program 
RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front; current political party; party of President Paul 
Kagame 
AOU   African Organization for Unity 
Old Case Refugees who fled Rwanda during the conflict in the 1960s and returned 
to Rwanda after the Genocide 
New Case Refugees who fled Rwanda during the conflict in the 1990s and returned 
to Rwanda after the Genocide 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
MININTER  Ministry of the Interior 
EDPRS  Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
EICV   Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 
WDA   Workforce Development Authority 
GIS   Geospatial Information System 
LTR   Land Tenure Regularization 
RSTF   Rural Settlement Task Force 
ICT   Information Communication Technology 
Rural area  An area which is mainly characterized by agricultural and livestock 
activities. It is also characterized by a small number of medium-height 
buildings within a cluster of dwellings 
Resettlement  Operation consisting of reorganizing a group settlement site by modifying 
the composition and layout of its components 
Group Settlement   Included in the settlement organization plan applicable in Rwanda on 
which grouped houses of the same standard are erected and which is fully 


















































































 Following the 1994 Genocide, Rwanda embarked on an ambitious plan to resettle its 
entire rural population into thousands of planned settlements across the country.  Development 
agencies at the time were skeptical of such a plan as similar efforts across Africa had largely 
failed and were crippled by corruption, human rights abuses and poor follow through.  Rwanda 
however, has been an exception.  Twenty years after the initial Human Settlement Policy was 
introduced, Rwanda has made notable strides towards addressing land use planning, a poor 
education record, high levels of poverty and low levels of health access.  Through national-level 
strategies, clear and concise goals, adequate international and domestic funding, and an acute 
recognition of its vulnerable populations, Rwanda is now leading Africa in economic, health, 
education, and environmental standards.  This thesis explores Rwanda’s resettlement practices 
and argues that it could not have been realized without thoughtful and decisive actions taken by 













RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH 
The United Nations High Commission on Refugees Annual Global Trends Report from 
2016 stated that forced displacement is the highest ever recorded by the 70-year old agency with 
an unprecedented 65.6 million people around the world currently displaced from their homes by 
conflict and persecution (UNHCR, 2016). This trend is unlikely to remain at such extraordinary 
levels, and predictably, in the coming years, many countries will begin to experience return 
migration, causing new and additional stress on post conflict countries.  The problems of land 
scarcity and an insufficient built environment for returning refugee populations provides ample 
opportunity for planners to utilize urban and rural settlement practices and policies.  These 
efforts should be aimed at addressing the issues of poverty, security of tenure, land-use planning, 
housing needs, infrastructure development, and provisions of social services; practices which are 
often overlooked beyond the urban context. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 This thesis aims to study the Rwandan rural resettlement efforts known colloquially as 
imidugudu (singular: umudugudu)1, which have been carried out across Rwanda for the past 20 
years.  It asks, how does the Rwandan rural resettlement program address issues of accessibility 
and poverty reduction for its rural agrarian population?  In order to do this, a clear examination 
of the role of the policies and supporting agencies for rural resettlement needs to take place. This 
requires understanding the specific background of the rural resettlement program and analyzing 
the extent of its outcomes.  This research will expand on the discipline of urban planning in that 
it examines a way in which use of policy driven rural resettlement planning efforts can take into 
account high rates of poverty, low rates of literacy, access to water, sanitation, as well as access 
to, and creation of, adequate housing.   
METHODOLOGY 
Rwanda was selected because it is a data rich developing nation and both case-based and 
in-country observations could be tailored to an illuminative description of the rural settlement 
program.  Data was captured using people’s personal perspectives and lived experiences and was 
also derived from carefully reviewed policy papers and previously conducted research 
assessments.  The primary data source for this thesis is based on interviews, focus groups and 
observations conducted while in Rwanda from December 29th 2017 to January 7th 2018.  
During that time, interviews were conducted with officials in the Rwandan Housing Authority, 
the Ministry of Local Government, the Kirehe District Mayor, sector leaders, cell leaders, three 
village leaders and over twenty village residents in five different villages.  Research was 
conducted in Eastern Province, Southern Province and Western Province and interviews and 
informal conversations were conducted in both English and through a local Rwandan graduate 
                                                
1 Umudugudu (pl. imidugudu) is the Kinyarwanda word for village and became the name of the initial program of 
resettlement enacted by the Rwandan Ministry of Local Government in 1998 and is still used colloquially today 





student fluent in the local language, Kinyarwanda.  Interview questions included basic 
demographic questions as well as gathering histories of resettlement and government 
accommodations during the resettlement process (Appendix A).   
Interviewees were selected based on availability and willingness and consisted mostly of 
women and genocide survivors while much of the leadership, both local and in the government, 
had held their positions for many years and were very knowledgeable on the topic of 
resettlement.  All meetings with government officials were arranged prior to arriving in country 
and were selected based on existing organizational structures posted on government websites and 
based on their role in the rural resettlement process.  Through a network of American Peace Corp 
volunteers, a Rwanda-based Canadian NGO, and a dual-national Rwandan/American religious 
leader living in Rwanda, research was also able to include visits with two village leaders as well 
as the Kirehe District Mayor. 
Secondary data sources included assessments written by international organizations and 
non-governmental organizations such as the United Nations, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Human Rights Watch, the International Peace Institute as 
well as scholarly articles studying the many aspects of land, environment and housing in 
Rwanda.  Additional and crucial documents include the policies themselves.  The Government of 
Rwanda has a robust online database for each of their government agencies and documents and 
reports from the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA), Ministry of Local Government 
(MINALOC), the Rwandan Housing Authority (RHA), the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRA) 
and the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) have each confirmed much of what 
was observed while traveling to Rwanda.  These online databases have updated organizational 
structures, policy documents, news articles, survey results, reports, raw data, and updated census 
information for each district of Rwanda.  The information on these websites is collected by and 
reported from the central government, therefore an additional purpose of this study was to 
confirm the extensively published government policies with observations and perspectives on the 
ground.  
The literature review for this research resulted in the discovery of many documents 
produced by international organizations such as the World Bank, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), African Development Bank (ADB) as well as a plethora of 
information from the Rwandan government itself.  Academic research on the rural resettlement 
program consisted of early documents prior to 2003 analyzing the early years of the resettlement 
process as well as an extensive report published by Human Rights Watch (2003) discussing the 
violations they observed as they reported early forced relocation taking place across the country 
from 1998-2003.  Extensive work went into examining early policy documents and analysis of 
programs from 2000-2012.  However, extensive research on the topic of rural resettlement has 
not been conducted in recent years making this thesis a unique contribution to academia and 
highly contingent on the primary research data that was gathered. 
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Much of the initial resettlement efforts in the late 1990s was conducted under the former 
government and not documented thoroughly given the post crisis state of Rwanda at the time.  





to analyze thoroughly due to the lack of information and repeated unsuccessful attempts to find 
the original text of the original 1998 Human Settlement Policy.  
Additionally, time in Rwanda was impactful, but not long enough to get more than a brief 
understanding of the intricacies involved in a nation-wide rural resettlement program.  While 
there, research and interviews were conducted in five different villages and discussions with 
approximately twenty residents took place.  These involved discussing their experiences with the 
resettlement program and the quality of their lives as a result of the move from scattered to 
planned settlement. Interviews were also conducted with a number of leadership and key 
facilitators from the local and central government.  Although the overall outcomes of the rural 
resettlement program seemed to be positive, there were a number of residents who appeared to 
be a bit guarded.  Rwanda is known for its tight control and restriction of opposing government 
viewpoints within the population, and given that this resettlement program is government 
sponsored, there may have been a bit of hesitancy during interviews to fully divulge true 
opinions of the program. 
Finally, a certain level of skepticism is healthy in an analysis of government programs 
where much of the information comes from the government themselves.  Although Rwanda 
prides itself on government transparency, and the sheer number of published reports, documents, 
and surveys of its population is commendable, the entirety of this report does not even begin to 
touch on the enormity of the lived experiences of those who were the subjects of this program.   
BACKGROUND    
Rwanda, “the land of 
1000 hills”, is a landlocked 
country in east-central Africa, 
and has an area of 26,338 
square km, slightly smaller than 
the U.S. state of Maryland.  As 
of 2018, Rwanda’s population 
hovers at approximately 12.2 
million people and it is one of 
the smallest and most densely 
populated countries in Africa 
with 474 inhabitants per square 
kilometer 
(WorldPopulationReview, 
accessed March 17, 2018).  The 
high rural population density 
causes acute land concerns and 
strain on the country’s agrarian 
economy which makes up 63% 
of its GDP (CIA World 
Factbook accessed March 28, 
2018).  The centrally located capital city of Kigali has a population of approximately 750,000 
residents; less than seven percent of the total population of the country. 





As of 2017, approximately 83% of the population lived in rural areas and more than 70% 
of the population worked in subsistence farming (CIA World Factbook, accessed Feb 2, 2018).  
Rwanda has a temperate climate with two rainy and two dry seasons each year making it a prime 
location for its agricultural society.  
Relocation and resettlement programs for rural refugee populations across Africa are not 
a new concept.  Ethiopia and Tanzania implemented rural resettlement plans, or, villagization2 in 
the 1970s and 1980s constituting one of the largest mass movements of people anywhere in the 
world at that time.  These efforts, largely publicized as necessary for ecological and land scarcity 
issues, were expansive and affected millions of rural residents.  The stated purpose of 
villagization in each of these cases was twofold: to create the necessary "preconditions" for 
agrarian socialism, and to facilitate the provision of human social services by concentrating 
scattered homesteaders into central communities (Steingraber, 1987). 
In the end, these programs largely failed, causing massive long-term issues due to low-
budgets, poor planning, political corruption, and lack of support from international organizations.  
Human rights reports show massive violations as populations in these countries were hastily, 
forcibly, and pitilessly uprooted from their homes and resettled on unviable land often in the 
midst of growing season leaving thousands without food or economic means, far removed from 
medical and education services (Gebru, 2009).   
Based on the negative outcome of Ethiopia’s and Tanzania’s villagization program, the 
international community largely did not support subsequent rural resettlement programs in 
Africa.  Rwanda was unique however in that the 1994 Genocide ultimately left the new 
leadership with a country of displaced people, many of them needing places to live and resources 
to resettle and start over.  This gave the concept a villagization a new and different way to be 
applied as a possible solution for dealing with mass returning refugee and internally displaced 
populations.  This unique combination of efforts in Rwanda’s approach to villagization made it a 
distinctive case study for tackling such issues head on. Through a series of progressive policies, 
embracing of cultural and traditional practices, updated and inclusive land tenure laws, massive 
government decentralization and significant investments of international aid, the past twenty 
years of Rwandan history has seen a marked change in how land, people, and services are 
accommodated and accounted for on a mass scale.  Today, Rwanda has made substantial 
progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy with low inflation and an average annual 
growth rate of six to eight percent, in addition to dropping child mortality by two thirds, near 
universal primary school enrollment and a strong focus on homegrown policies and initiatives 
(CIA World Factbook, accessed Feb 2, 2018).     
1960-1993 
Rwanda was colonized most recently by the Belgians3 from 1916-1962.  The Belgians 
put forth massive efforts to engineer and segregate the population by ethnically classifying the 
tribes of Rwanda into Hutu and Tutsi clans, of which the Tutsi’s were considered the ‘greater’ of 
                                                
2	Villagization is defined as the (usually mandatory) concentration of the population in villages as opposed to 
scattered settlements, typically to ensure more efficient control and distribution of services such as health care and 
education. 
3 Rwanda (then Rwanda-Urundi) was originally colonized by Germany but the land was transferred to Belgium 





the two and enjoyed relative power and privilege compared to their Hutu neighbors.  In 
November 1959, a violent incident sparked a Hutu uprising in which hundreds of Tutsi were 
killed and thousands displaced and forced to flee to neighboring countries.  By Rwanda’s 
independence from Belgium in 1962, nearly 120,000 refugees, mostly Tutsi, had fled Rwanda 
for neighboring countries leaving the Hutu majority the newest leaders of the small country. 
Additional conflicts between Tutsi rebels and the Hutu government continued for the next 20 
years and during this time, an additional 480,000 refugees fled Rwanda, mostly to the 
neighboring countries of Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania (United Nations Outreach 
Program on the Rwanda Genocide, accessed Feb 2, 2018). 
Also happening during the time of decolonization were efforts to develop and expand the 
city of Kigali as the capital of the country.  The early phases of establishing infrastructure and 
public utilities drew an influx of Rwandans to the city in search of employment and social 
services while poor rural Rwandans continued to live in unplanned familial residential areas, 
often on plots prone to either flooding or on very steep hillsides.  This led to urban density within 
Kigali as well as dispersed farming settlements throughout the country - all lacking basic 
services and infrastructure.  In 1969, Rwanda’s population was around two million people and 
had the highest population density in Africa with 360 inhabitants per square mile 4(Brosha, 
2010).  The population at this time was nearly all agrarian and the climate, soil and topography 
provided optimal conditions for varied and sustainable agriculture.  However, due to the already 
high and increasing population density, there was resulting decrease in arable land, and food crop 
production failed to keep pace with the rapid population growth.  Increasingly, farmers began 
working the untenable land on steep slopes and in flood plains in an effort to feed their families 
and the flexibility to allow for plots to “rest” between growing cycles was more difficult.  This 
caused increasing stress on the land resulting in lost productivity and additional strain on families 
whose ability to provide was very much dependent on the success of their farms (Brosha, 2010).  
By the end of the 1980s, Rwanda’s agricultural resource base had been decimated by 
multiple conflicts, poor crop planning and agricultural overuse. In terms of croplands, forestry, 
and livestock, traditional coping strategies had given way to short-term thinking and survival 
instincts.  By the end of the decade, half of all farming was taking place on steep slopes that once 
would have been considered unfit for agriculture resulting in over a decade of declining land 
productivity (Brosha, 2010).  According to Luc Bonneux (1994), “the general situation in 1993 
was such that less than 10% of the population lived in cities; most were living ‘up the hill’, in 
fragile ecosystems that were fast eroding due to deforestation and unsustainable agriculture.  
Nevertheless, 40% of the gross domestic product was generated by agriculture, there being 
virtually no other industries in the country.”  In a country plagued by civil war, food shortages 
and land scarcity, the impending destruction of genocide would wipe out not just hundreds of 
thousands of lives, but also destroy the country’s agricultural livelihood and uproot and scatter 
the remaining population.  
THE GENOCIDE 
From October 1990 to 1993 the country of Rwanda was occupied with a massive civil 
war between the Hutu government forces known as the Rwanda Armed Forces (RAF) and the 
Tutsi rebels made up of mostly displaced Tutsi refugees conducting attacks from across the 
                                                





Ugandan border. In 1993, in an effort to stop the fighting, the Arusha Peace Agreement was 
crafted and organized by the African Organization for Unity (AOU) with a goal of establishing a 
path to peace between the government and the RPF. The Arusha Peace Agreement was then 
signed in Arusha, Tanzania on April 4, 1994 by the government of Rwanda and the RPF, under 
the mediation of France and the United States.  The agreement included points considered 
necessary for lasting peace to include establishing rule of law, repatriation of refugees both from 
fighting and from power sharing agreements, and the merging of the government and the RPF 
(United Nations Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide, accessed Feb 2, 2018).  On April 
6th, upon return from Arusha, the plane carrying both the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was 
shot down on approach into Kigali International Airport.  Within 30 minutes of the crash, Hutu 
extremists, who had been planning and propagating a Tutsi extermination fervently over the 
previous months, set up roadblocks. They were manned by Hutu militiamen, gendarmerie 
(paramilitary police) and military personnel who then began to identify and kill Tutsis as the 
Genocide began. 
From April to July 1994, 
members of Hutu militias and 
ordinary Hutu citizens were incited 
by local officials to take up arms 
against their neighbors, and across 
Rwanda they collectively and 
violently murdered 800,000 people. 
By the time the Tutsi-led RPF 
gained control of the country 
through a military offensive in early 
July, hundreds of thousands of 
Rwandans were dead and many 
more displaced from their homes or 
had fled the country (figure 2). The 
RPF victory, and fears by Hutus of a 
potential reprisal for the genocide, 
created an additional two million 
more refugees (mainly Hutus) 
fleeing Rwanda, exacerbating what 
had already become a full-blown 
humanitarian crisis (history.com staff 2009, accessed Feb 2, 2018). In the months following the 
Genocide, tens of thousands of mostly Tutsi refugees from prior decades, known as old case 
refugees, returned to Rwanda.  Having been gone for so long, they found themselves returning to 
a country destroyed by genocide and to communities, homesteads and farmland that was no 
longer recognizable or legally belonging to anyone.   
From 1994 to 1996, Rwanda was still in the midst of conflict with attacks happening 
between newly empowered Tutsi officials and the former Rwandan military and police living in 
the camps on the then Zaire border.  The camps were created by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and were put together so hastily that many Hutu refugees 
died from cholera and dysentery.  These camps, home to many of the leaders of the genocide and 
former leaders of the Hutu regime, who were working to rearm and push back into Rwanda to 
retake the government.  To counter this offensive, the RPF began launching counter attacks 
FIGURE 2: ESTIMATED EXODUS FROM APRIL TO AUGUST 





against these militias within Zaire causing another wave of hundreds of thousands of refugees, 
known as new case returnees, to return to Rwanda. 
This second wave of new case refugees back into Rwanda from Zaire, were invariably 
Hutu refugees, many who had participated in the genocide.  This wave created the potential for 
conflict as they were also returning to land they had only left in 1994, often finding old wave 
refugees now occupying their farms, homes and communities creating widespread housing, land, 
and food shortages.  Critically, despite having just been the victims of a mass genocide, the new 
RPF led government promised to respect the entitlements to property abandonment by the new 
case refugees recognizing their most recent abandoning of the properties.  This led to repatriating 
new case returnees being able to reclaim their houses and fields from old case returnees who had 
temporarily occupied. This however left many people displaced and homeless in the process.   
Not only was housing an acute problem, but both urban and rural areas needed more land 
to accommodate the influx of people as well as accommodate for the massive amounts of  
internally displaced people. Some new case repatriates stayed homeless upon finding their house 
destroyed or were unable to reclaim them from their new occupants. In some places, sharing 
arrangements were made between old case repatriates and new case returnees. A huge number of 
people, however, ended up living under plastic sheeting provided by relief agencies.  Estimates 
of the number of families in immediate need of housing in 1996 ranged from 250,000 to 300,000 
(van Leeuwen, 2001). 
In December of 1996, the Ministry of Public Works, in an effort to alleviate the 
increasing pressure for productive farmland, instructed rural residents to begin moving into 
regrouped settlements.  The goal of these instructions was to encourage the development of rural 
centers into planned settlements as a way to improve the living conditions of the population as 
well as create a more sustainable plan for agriculture to support the population moving forward.  
After years of concerns by policy makers and observers, the new Government of National Unity 
Cabinet decided that this would also help alleviate unplanned land as the regrouping would allow 
for increasing contiguous farmland plots for agriculture and grazing while offering more 
opportunities to provide basic services to grouped settlements.  This plan was then advertised as 
a way to promote reconciliation and send the message to all remaining refugees that there was 
land and space for them to repatriate should they want to return5.  Villages would then be 
required to facilitate the provisions of services.  In addition, the integration of different ethnic 
groups in the villages was expected to lead to better relations and potential social conflicts would 
be solved when formerly landless families were able to have access to land (van Leeuwen, 
2001). 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
 In 2000, there was significant efforts being made to resettle the population. At this time, 
the government of Rwanda, led by RPF Commander, President Paul Kagame, enacted a series of 
programs and policies that outlined the future of Rwanda as a unified country working towards 
                                                
5 In summer 2017, the United Nations evoked the Cessation Clause which declares Rwanda safe for its refugees 
across the world to return.  Many neighboring countries who offered asylum required the return of all refugees by 






the goal of leading Africa in economics, growth, education and health.  As Defense Minister and 
Vice President from 1996-2000, Paul Kagame, then serving under President Bizimungu pushed 
the government to be a non-ethnic and inclusive representation of Rwanda moving forward.  
Ethnicity was removed from all citizens’ national identity cards and the distinction between the 
Hutu and Tutsi was downplayed and encouraged to be ignored.  Upon his election in May 2000, 
President Kagame also set up a constitutional commission which was required to adhere to a set 
of fundamental principles to include equitable power sharing and democracy in recognition of 
the Arusha Peace Agreement, signed prior to the Genocide.  The commission sought to ensure 
that the draft constitution was "home-grown", relevant to Rwanda's specific needs, and reflected 
the views of the entire population; they sent questionnaires to civil groups across the country and 
rejected offers of help from the international community, except for financial assistance 
(Gasamagera, 2007).  The new constitution was voted on and approved in May 2003. 
RWANDA VISION 2020 
 Rwanda Vision 2020 was also a plan of the new Kagame government and continues to be 
the driving force behind much of the post-conflict follow-on development in Rwanda.  Vision 
2020 was also frequently referenced as a guiding document by government officials and local 
leaders while conducting research in Rwanda.  Launched in 2000 as an effort to avoid further 
uncontrolled growth, it aimed to create a unified goal for each of the government agencies. The 
Vision provides the country’s overall macro-economic development framework and emphasizes 
the instrumental role of land use management in the country’s development.  The document also 
outlines the strategic overarching goals for the next twenty years with the overall intent to 
fundamentally transform Rwanda into a middle-income country providing access to basic 
infrastructure services, such as shelter, electricity and drainage.  Specifically, it stated that its 
“aim is to attain a per capita income of a middle-income country in an equitable way, with 
aspiration to become a modern, strong and united nation, without discrimination between its 
citizens.” (Rwanda Vision 2020) The policy consists of a list of goals which the government 
aims to achieve before the year 2020 which include reconstruction, infrastructure and transport 
improvements, good governance, improving agriculture production, private sector development, 
and health and education improvements (Kinzer, 2008).  
 Referencing the issues of infrastructure, land use planning and settlement as one of the 
policy’s six pillars, Rwanda 2020 states; Rwanda will pursue a harmonious policy of grouped 
settlements based on economic activity. Rural settlements organized into active development 
centers will be equipped with basic infrastructure and services. This system of settlement will 
serve as an entry point into the development of non-agricultural income generating activities. 
Land will be reorganized and consolidated so as to create adequate space for modern and viable 
farming. (Rwanda Vision 2020, Pg. 18) 
 Rwanda Vision 2020 is critical in that it brings together all levels of government to work 
towards a common goal.  The key ministries involved in its outlined execution of the rural 
resettlement program include the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC), the Ministry of 
Infrastructure (MININFRA), the Rwandan Housing Authority (RHA) and efforts from the 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and the Land Tenure 





HOME GROWN SOLUTIONS 
One of the ways that Rwanda is unique in its resettlement approach, is the way in which 
the new laws and policies have integrated historical customs and traditions within the execution 
of the plans.  These cultural and traditional practices date back to pre-colonization times and 
have allowed for things such as community service, poverty alleviation and political processes to 
build national unity by emphasizing culturally recognized activities for use in working toward 
accomplishing the goals of Rwanda Vision 2020. These principles, incorporated into daily lives, 
have set the tone for collective action across the country, which touches on every facet of the 
rural resettlement program.  These “home grown solutions” are the foundation of 
accommodating the rural resettlement process and have been used the identify and address the 
issues of accessibility to social services and address poverty across the rural population. 
UMUGANDA 
Umuganda is a tradition that translates to, ‘coming together in common purpose to 
achieve an outcome’.  Today, umuganda continues to be ‘community work’ and Rwandans 
between the ages of 18-60 are encouraged and often required to participate in four hours of 
community labor on the last Saturday of each month.  Ministry of Local Government estimates 
that 80% of the Rwandan population takes part and projects include infrastructure development, 
building schools, medical centers, hydroelectric plants as well as rehabilitation of wetlands and 
agricultural plots.  Estimates of the value of umuganda to the country’s development since 2007 
is estimated at approximately $60 million USD (African Development Bank – Rwandapedia, 
2018). A number of challenges do arise with such an effort and these large events require 
massive amounts of planning and coordination which can sometimes lead to wasted time, lack of 
resources and highly unattainable goals.  Umuganda also has much higher rates of participation 
in rural communities than urban centers which likely is a result of urban populations having less 
sense of community, and ownership of their neighborhood than smaller rural populations and 
communities.  Umuganda has been a crucial aspect of carrying out the resettlement program.  It 
is estimated that over 12 million man-hours are contributed to community development efforts 
each month6, much of which has been realized by way of building public services at the 
umudugudu level.  This sense of community development and oneness while coming together to 
work on projects for the collective population has been an effective way that the Rwandan 
tradition of umuganda is being used to build on community planning principles. 
UBUDEHE 
The strongest and most impactful cultural applications being used in rural settlement 
planning and poverty reduction today is called ubudehe which refers to the long-standing 
Rwandan practice and culture of collective action and mutual support to solve problems within a 
community (African Development Bank – Rwandapedia, 2018).  The focus of traditional 
ubudehe was mostly on cultivation and collectively working together to most productively feed 
the community.  Today, ubudehe is a poverty reduction strategy launched as part of a partnership 
between the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Ministry of Local Government.  
                                                
6 Estimate of man-hours is based off of average number of participants each month (three million) multiplied by the 





The overarching objective of ubudehe is to categorically place people within very specific and 
defined levels of poverty or wealth in order to best address the needs of those who are within the 
lowest poverty levels.  In order to do this, a poverty level category system was created by the 
central government where households and villages each determine the poverty level of each 
family in their community (see Figure 3).  This is done once every one to two years and is 
conducted by an ubudehe committee of inyangamugayo (people of integrity) who outline the 
needs of the people and a plan for development priorities within the village moving forward.  
Simultaneously, the same process is conducted at the household level and families are expected 
to examine their own personal finances and assets and report to the committee which category 
they believe they fall into.  In an effort to remain transparent and consistent across the 
community, the household poverty level categorization takes place publically with all heads of 
households gathered to report their status which then must be further validated by the village 
leadership themselves. 
 
A key part of ubudehe is that the residents of a community define the levels of poverty 
that exist in their own village and everyone is aware of their relative level of wealth compared to 
that of their neighbors.  This theoretically acts as an equalizer among citizens and the 
information is ultimately used to decide development priorities as well as who should benefit 
from other social security programs.   
While conducting research, many of the interviews with leadership revolved around this 
practice of ubudehe.  The process of classifying residents that happens each year at the village 
level and village leaders that were interviewed reported it to be a long but relatively smooth 
process.  They expressed its importance when the district government distributed tin sheets for 
roofs or goats or cows as they could easily consult the list of who required the most assistance.  
Village leaders also confirmed that the more ‘vulnerabilities’ a family had, the more likely they 
were to receive support which also greatly affected their ranking on the list.  Vulnerabilities 
include, disability, gender, genocide survivor status, orphan status, elderly, etc.  Village leaders 
also discussed the importance of finding work for category one residents.  They reported that 
low-wage jobs that needed to be done in the community were often delegated to those who could 
work in an effort for them to ‘earn’ their way out of poverty while those who couldn’t work in 
category one were prioritized for more direct accommodation and resources.  
Ubudehe Category Definition (Government of Rwanda) 
0 Abject Poverty 
(Abatindi nyakujya) 
owns no property, lives by begging and is wholly dependent on others 
1 Very Poor 
Abatindi  




malnourished, owns a small portion of land, has low production capacity and 
cannot afford secondary education for their children 
3 Resourceful Poor 
(Abakene Bifashije) 
own some land, cattle, a bicycle and have average production capacity-can 
afford secondary education and have fewer difficulties accessing health care 
4 Food Rich 
(Abakungu jumba) 
own large portions of land, can afford a balanced diet and live in decent 
houses, employ others, own cattle, and can afford university education 
5 Money Rich 
(Abakire) 
have money in banks, can receive bank loans, own an above average house, a 
car, cattle, fertile lands, have access to sufficient food and have permanent 
employment. 





Village leaders and the RHA Housing Regulations Manager were asked if categories two 
and three were ever seemingly envious of the resources distributed to those who were not quite 
as well off as them.  The village leaders reported that was usually not a problem and few 
conflicts ever arose. The RHA on the other hand seemed surprised with the question as he also 
had never considered that to be a potential issue.  In fact, the Housing Regulations Manager 
expressed that across Rwanda, the general population had a collective interest to raise the quality 
of life of the poorest population in an effort to all work towards improving the life of the 
population as a whole.  Ubudehe was not discussed among villagers for this thesis, therefore 
further research is required in an effort to determine the underlying nuances of comparing 
neighbors and creating an entitlement program based on relative wealth.  Assumingly, similar to 
entitlement programs in the United States and elsewhere, people may feel that claiming to be 
more or less poor than they are will result in additional resources to be allocated to them 
resulting in inaccurate reporting of one’s status. 
Ultimately, ubudehe is both unique to Rwanda as well as critical for poverty reduction as 
it very precisely identifies those who need the most assistance to get out of poverty.  Families 
and houses that are not within an umudugudu are also accounted for by the nearest umudugudu 
leader but the collective decisions of the community are less accurate and remote households 
may be left out of the process all together.  By resettling the scattered population into villages, 
not only are those families then able to access the resources and economy that a village has, but 
they are then part of the ubudehe process in its entirety, ensuring that they are included when 
resources are allocated, should they need them. 
GIRINKA 
Girinka, translates to ‘may you have a cow’ and describes a centuries old cultural 
practice in Rwanda whereby a cow was given by one person to another, either as a sign of 
respect and gratitude, or as a marriage dowry.  During Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide, 90 percent of 
cattle were slaughtered, devastating the livelihoods of many Rwandans (UNICEF, 2011). In 
Rwanda, social status is often acknowledged through the possession of cattle, a strong symbol of 
wealth. By providing the poorest households with cattle, the Girinka program improves the 
livelihoods of those most in need and institutes lost pride through the recovery of a traditional 
symbol of wealth (UNICEF, 2011).  The cow not only supplies milk, which can be an important 
source of nutrition and income to families, but also manure, which is a source of fertilizer for 
crops and biogas for cooking (UNICEF, 2011). Girinka was initiated in response to the 
alarmingly high rate of childhood malnutrition and as a way to accelerate poverty reduction and 
integrate livestock and crop farming while simultaneously allowing for increased opportunities 
for income while resettling people into umudugudu settlements. The program works in two steps: 
first, a poor family receives a cow free of charge. Second, when the initial cow reproduces, the 
first female calf is given to a neighbor who then passes on a subsequent female calf to another 
neighbor, and so on.  
The program is based on the premise that providing a dairy cow to poor households helps 
to improve their livelihood as a result of a more nutritious and balanced diet from milk, increased 
agricultural output through better soil fertility (by way of fertilizer) as well as greater incomes by 
commercializing dairy products.  Since its introduction in 2006, more than 198,000 beneficiaries 
have received cows, of which 60,000 were funded by the ubudehe program targeting the poorest 





increase in agricultural production in Rwanda - especially milk products which have helped 
reduce malnutrition and increase incomes. The program aims to provide 350,000 cows to 
ubudehe categories zero through two families by 2017 (Government of Rwanda). 
Coupled with ubudehe, girinka is a common method of resource allocation for poor 
families.  When category one or two families move into settled areas they are often given a cow 
as a ‘starter tool’ to sustain them and begin working on their ascent out of poverty.  Girinka is a 
key aspect of the poverty reduction program and its use is best accounted for when cows are 
most fairly allocated through the umudugudu leaders and the ubudehe program.  Obviously, this 
is more difficult to do when people live in scattered settlements rather than within the boundaries 
of a village.  By encouraging the resettlement into villages, residents have the increased 
possibility to benefit from programs such as girinka making it a critical tool of the resettlement 
program. 
IMIHIGO 
 Imihigo, which translates to ‘vow to deliver’, describes the pre-colonial cultural practice 
where an individual sets targets or goals to be achieved within a specific period of time.  This 
practice has been one of the most critical aspects of accountability and equity across the country 
of Rwanda as it instills a sense of ownership and duty to perform among leaders across the 
country. Contemporary imihigo was implemented by President Paul Kagame in 2006 with the 
main objective of making public agencies and institutions more effective and accountable in their 
implementation of national programs and to accelerate the socio-economic development agenda 
as contained in Vision 2020.  Imihigo is closely tied to ubudehe, umuganda, and girinka as it is a 
list of goals and priorities for each of the 30 districts, in line with the central government 
strategic goals.  The main focus is on economic development, poverty reduction, good 
governance and social welfare.  Each year, leaders are asked to take into account cross cutting 
issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, environment, social inclusion and youth.  Keeping this in 
mind, every village produces its goals and requirements for the coming year, to include updated 
ubudehe for families, progress of poverty reduction as people move through the ubudehe 
categories requirements for/status of schools, roads, hospitals, houses and/or construction and 
resource needs for the poorest residents.   This information is consolidated at the cell level, then 
again at the sector and finally, at the district level who then reports their priorities directly to the 
President and the central government.  District leaders across Rwanda are asked to prepare plans 
that are realistic, take into account the cost of delivering services as well as the available 
resources. To make sure that proper monitoring and evaluation can be conducted, indicators, 
targets and outputs must be clearly identified in the planning process. 
During the imihigo process, the goals of the prior year are also examined and each village 
reports up the line which of last year’s goals have been accomplished. In order to make each 
leader most accountable to their residents as well as prove their effectiveness as a leader, each 
district’s imihigo results are televised and sense of competition is instilled by way of ranking 
best performing to worst performing districts across the country.  The system of checks and 
balances is organic to the process as full transparency of each level of governments results, as 
reported to the central government, is posted online and in newspapers and is thus able to be 
examined for validity and truthfulness by all residents across the country.  District leaders who 
perform well in their imihigo (hitting 70% of their goals or more) are given a bonus while district 





Kirehe District Mayor noted that imihigo was a very stressful time for leadership and each year 
he hoped that his numbers would be favorable to him serving another term.  Critically, this lends 
itself to further research to determine whether or not leadership ever feels compelled to adjust 
their numbers in an effort to keep their jobs or ‘win’ the imihigo competition. 
The imihigo process is important to the rural resettlement program because the success of 
each level of leadership is contingent on resources being allocated fairly and accurately across 
the country.  Throughout the reporting process, current and future years budgets can then have a 
high level of accountability as projects are complete.  It also drives the planning for projects 
during umuganda, allocation from the central government to the districts and finally, to the 
village levels and needs for hospitals can be identified, and roads, schools etc. are also part of the 
imihigo.  This process drives the development of social services of which addressing issues of 
accessibility and poverty are then secondary and tertiary issues that can also be improved upon.                                        
 
FIGURE 4 CYCLE OF HOME-GROWN SOLUTIONS 
 
RESETTLEMENT TO UMUDUGUDU  
Barret et al. (2001) report that diversification of livelihoods to nonfarm activities is 
typically positively correlated with income and wealth. In rural Africa, this translates to the 
presence of more land and livestock in rural livelihoods. These indicators of wealth can offer a 
pathway out of poverty but only if rural poor can benefit from their nonfarm occupational 
activities such as working in markets, schools’ clinics, etc.  The idea that clustering these farmers 
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schools, and health facilities all create new opportunities for labor, selling of produce, and 
creation of stronger local economies to participate in nonfarming activities.  
The positive wealth-nonfarm correlation may also suggest that those already poor in land 
and capital face an uphill battle because entry barriers to step into nonfarming activities are high. 
Not only in terms of financial investment but also in access to human and social capabilities. The 
latter is important to get access to (in)formal groups sharing information, skills and investments.  
Barret et al. (2001) 
The rural resettlement program addresses the poverty gap for rural farmers head on.  It 
does this by creating small economies of opportunity, wealth, and access to human and social 
capital.  By removing the stress of land and house ownership and ensuring the basic provisions 
of a cow, education for children, basic health access and sanitation, rural farmers are able to 
sustain themselves, their family and continue working to increase their wealth and assets. 
BUDGET  
 Rwanda’s 2018 government spending will be an increase of seven percent from fiscal 
year 2017 to $2.58 billion Rwandan Francs, with 17 percent of the budget being funded by 
external donors and the rest coming from internal revenue and borrowing (Reuters, 2017). The 
below published budget for rural development shows that 17 percent (approx. $693M USD), of 
the entire budget for each of the next three years will be spent on rural development and creating 
opportunities within umudugudu to encourage people into these grouped settlements. 
 
FIGURE 5 BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR NEXT THREE FISCAL YEARS – CURRENCY IN RWANDAN FRANCS 





IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RURAL SETTLEMENT POLICY 
The rural settlement policy as directed by the Rural Settlement Task Force, under the 
Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) is the driving document for the physical 
implementation of the rural resettlement program and focuses on the site selection and 
umudugudu creation and expansion.  This policy outlines the specifications for each new and 
existing umudugudu which is then enforced by way of permits, building codes and delegating 
power to village leaders as well as holding them accountable.  In areas where families are 
dispersed, the policy states; every cell with over one hundred families or two cells close to each 
other should choose a site to accommodate at least 100 to 200 houses. It can have up to 500 
maximum houses to attract a small business for entrepreneurs to do business.  These sites should 
have basic infrastructure in place or should be located where infrastructure can easily be 
installed.  Further, the policy states that the umudugudu should be within three kilometers of 
crop farms, should not be in environmental risk zones, on a slope no greater than 40 percent and 
should be on less fertile ground with a minimum of four kilometers between villages (Rural 
Settlement Policy, MINALOC 2014).  Common kraals are encouraged near the population for 
easy manure accessibility for fertilizer and each site is expected to be left with enough space for 
expansion.  The size of the road in between the site should have a width of eight to 10 meters. 
Roads connecting homes should be at least six to eight meters in width and that two houses 
adjacent to each other should be in line and face a road. When planning where to put a road, it is 
necessary to consider slopes not exceeding 40 percent so as to reduce occurrences of soil erosion 
(Rural Settlement Policy, MINALOC, 2014). 
While traveling across Rwanda, the prevalence of scattered settlements was still obvious.  
Much of the following approaches to resettlement have gained traction more recently and the 
goal of 70% of rural households to be within an umudugudu by 2024 remains feasible.  Those 
with whom interviews were conducted were resettled in the past few years and their experiences 
are included in the following sections and match very closely with the processes both discussed 





















ORGANIC APPROACH TO SETTLEMENT 
 With the Human Settlement 
Policy, (Appendix B) the 
government set the tone for the 
future of habitation in Rwanda.  
Over the course of the early 
resettlement process however, 
Rwandans were very hesitant to 
leave their rural plots of land.  There 
was fear among the population 
regarding the political climate and 
unease over what direction the 
country would take, and leaving 
their familial land that was yet to be 
titled for life in a village was not a 
popular option.  Human Rights 
Watch in 1998 did report 
encountering forcible relocations in 
the early years of the program, 
reportedly in an effort to prove its success when international development agencies with large 
pocketbooks who came to see villagization for themselves.  They also reported intimidation by 
government official, armed police officers and a few even experienced violent relocations for 
those who were originally unwilling.  Based on reporting at the time, those incidents seemed 
mostly isolated to the first years of the program, however it is probable that they continued 
longer than that (Human Rights Watch, 2001). 
As time went on, the government was able to better support the requirement to more 
organically settle within imidugudu by way of site planning and progressive land tenure laws and 
incentives.  These efforts were responsible for delineating property and entering coordinates and 
survey results in GIS at the community level which allowed Rwandans legal documentation of 
their land and homes.  The decentralization of the governments oversight of these laws down to 
the village level also allowed for village and community leaders to enforce the umudugudu 
policies on their own dispersed population by way of incentivizing residents to choose to relocate 
with the promise of better infrastructure, safer living conditions, certificates and titles, and access 
to social services such as schools and health facilities. 
Environmental safety is also a concern for the rural population as flooding and mudslides 
occur more frequently washing away homes, destroying crops and killing people and livestock.  
According to the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs report on High Risk 
Zones on Floods and Landslides (2012), floods and landslide are key disasters that frequently 
affect localized areas of the country and most of the affected people do not have efficient 
mechanisms to cope with natural hazards. In addition, the hilly topography and high annual 
precipitation rates with overexploitation of the natural environment such as deforestation, 
inappropriate farming and poor housing techniques accelerate the disaster risks and hence result 
into losses of lives and damages to property from the community exposed to these disaster risks.  
Using the Home-Grown Solution of ubudehe, village leaders are able to track the rural 
population outside of the village boundary and account for families and homes that are in the 
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greatest risk of environmental hazards.  When resources from the central government are 
allocated to the cell level, leaders are able to identify which families or homes are of greatest risk 
(often tied to ubudehe) and then offer assistance to relocate.   
According to the officials at the Rwandan Housing Authority, families who are not in the 
lowest ubudehe category also have the option to move into an umudugudu if they currently 
reside in environmental high-risk zones.  In these cases, the government purchases their high-risk 
land from them at market rate in an effort to discourage them from selling it to another family, 
and then allows them to purchase more environmentally stable land from the government nearby 
and for a discounted price leaving them with additional funds as an incentive.  The second 
incentive in this transaction is that they will also be given a free home within the umudugudu as 
well as a cow (girinka) and seed to begin planting on their new land.  In order to discourage 
families from generating income by renting out their new homes within the umudugudu, the 
family is required to live in the home for five years (interview with RHA, Jan 3, 2018).  At the 
end of the five years, and given they have lived in the home for the entire time, they are given the 
title to their home. 
Wealthy scattered families (ubudehe category three and four) in high risk zones are also 
encouraged to move into umudugudu.  In these cases, the government does not purchase their 
land from them, but rather gives them title to a new plot of land in a safe zone and then requires 
the family to build their own home on a plot of land provided by the government within the 
umudugudu.  In many cases, the family is able to keep ownership of their land in the high-risk 
zone, as long as they do not keep residence on it. 
IDP MODEL VILLAGE 
Vision 2020 sets the goal of at least 70 percent of households living in rural areas to 
move into integrated viable settlements before 20247.  In 2007 the Rwanda leadership came 
together at the Government of Rwanda’s Akagera Retreat to discuss their progress, challenges 
and a way forward for further developing the country’s rural sector.  The ultimate resolution of 
that conference called for finding a permanent solution to Rwanda’s rural settlement challenge so 
as to spur the socio-economic development of Rwandans living in rural areas. The solution to 
this problem became one of the largest accelerants of the umudugudu program which is known 
as the Integrated Development Approach Model Village, or, IDP Model Village. 
Model Villages have been a staple driving force for rural resettlement policy over the past 
few years and at least one has been funded in each of the 30 Districts with a goal of reaching 
each of the 416 sectors by 2024.  The intent for these IDP Model Villages is to offer economic 
opportunities, favor rational land use and management and accelerate servicing with basic social 
economic and physical infrastructures in rural areas.  Reshaping rural settlement in Rwanda 
through adapting an all-inclusive rural settlement model allows for providing a rural population 
access to clean water, electricity, health facilities, common marketplace, smart classrooms, 
improved road networks, common cowshed, and better agricultural practices.  
In 2009 the first IDP Model Village was created in Eastern Province as a settlement of 
365 single family houses and housed over 900 individuals.  Upon completion of that project, an 
                                                
7 The deadline of 2020 was realized to be too aggressive to thoughtfully resettle the population.  Therefore in 2016 it 





assessment was conducted by the local government to determine lessons learned for future model 
villages.  It was quickly realized that individual homes were not conducive to protecting the 
environment and were ineffective in its land use and preservation which were one of the tenants 
of the program.  Moving forward from that initial IDP, in 2015, a concept to create ‘four in one’ 
model homes, where four families would live in separate sections of the same structure, was 
created.  This concept was used on all future IDP model villages and today, Rwanda is 
experimenting with ‘six in one’ homes and ‘eight in one’ homes within their IDP model.  
When sitting down with the head of the IDP Model Village Program, located within 
MINALOC in the Capital of Kigali, he discussed the successes and future of the program.  
According to him, as of January 2018, there were 45 IDP Model Village sites that had been 
completed at a cost of 20BN Rwandan Francs (approximately $20 million).  This accounted for 
approximately 5,000 people who had been relocated since the program really took off in 2015. 
The specific workings of this 
program are unique and when 
considered on a large scale of 
accomplishing over 400 IDPs before 
2024, could be rather effective.  
Locations for these IDPs are decided 
by a National Steering Committee of 
Ministers made up of the Ministries 
of Local Administration, 
Infrastructure, Agriculture, 
Environment, Health, Commerce and 
Technology. To address all areas of 
development, these IDPs, often 
located in remote areas of the country to accommodate farmers who still require access to their 
land, and can be accessible by creation of a paved road connecting it to secondary cities around 
the country.  Each model village is also inclusive of a health center, a school, and a community 
hall.  Considering that less than four percent of the rural population is without access to a 
television (EICV, 2014), the community hall has a television that allows for more “modern and 
progressive ideas to be shared” with the rural population (interview with MINALOC, Jan 3, 
2018).  Within this community center there is also access to furniture, a meeting room, 
computers and each was operated using solar electricity.  Community leadership was also located 
in the community center to create accessibility with the villagers and as a central location for 
them to manage the policies and the security and police within the community. 





Also within the IDPs are employment creation centers and schools.  The employment 
center is run by the Workforce Development Agency (WDA) under the direction of the National 
Employment Program.  This employment center is a place for women and youth to train and 
support the community within the markets and to offer additional skills to a community that was 
previously most reliant on farming practices (interview with IDP lead official, Jan 3, 2018).  
Smart classrooms are a feature in each of the IDP model village schools where students are 
exposed to information and communication technology training (ICT).  Rwanda began to 
develop its ICT program in 2000 after it adopted the National Information Communications 
Infrastructure (NICI) policy. The 
NICI plan was further integrated 
into Vision 2020, “to transition 
Rwanda’s agrarian economy to an 
information-rich, knowledge-
based one by 2020.” (Ben-Ari, 
2014). 
Additional features of each 
IDP Model Village are kraals for 
cattle which are created on the 
edge of the community for manure 
collection and access to girinka-
donated cows; market buildings 
with built-in tables for farmers to 
sell produce; rainwater collection 
reservoirs; sanitation facilities and 
community clean water access 
points; and playgrounds and 
preschools for children under age 
six.  The edges of the IDP model 
villages are groomed and prepared for expansion and to encourage nearby scattered populations 
to also move within the village and enjoy the access to homes and social services that the IDP 
provides. 
IDP SELECTION CRITERIA 
There are a number of criteria for families to be selected for the IDP model villages.  
When a site is initially selected, the beneficiaries are then pulled from a pool of residents in the 
surrounding scattered farms.  The first to be selected are those in the lowest category of ubudehe 
who are also women headed households and/or disabled residents and/or genocide survivors.  
Even greater priority is given to those who meet the aforementioned criteria and are additionally 
living in high risk environmental zones.  Once those families are accounted for, priority is then 
given to those families who meet only one or two of those criteria.  The list is then approved by a 
district committee who is responsible for the oversight of the creation of IDP Model Villages in 
their districts. 





Once the houses are complete8, families who were selected are required to tear down 
their current home that is outside of an umudugudu (assumingly to prevent someone else from 
moving into it) and move into the IDP.  Once in the IDP, the family is given a cow, seeds, and 
three to six months of food to establish themselves in their new residence.  Their land is expected 
to be easily accessible and they are encouraged to continue to farm and be self-sufficient within 
six months of moving in. 
Not only does the government rely on the tenants of ubudehe to determine who has 
priority for government assisted resettlement, but also gives priority to those residents who 
currently live within high-risk zones.  These zones are determined by the central government 
land use planning map and are areas where households are in severe risk of landslides and/or 
flooding.  In order to ensure that these families move to safer and more viable options for homes 
while still being able to access their farmland, IDP model villages are created.  The process in 
which the location is determined is a combined effort of the Rwanda Housing Authority (RHA), 
the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA), the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) 
and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).  Once a location for a settlement is determined based on the 
topographical conditions of an area, additional steps are taken to ensure that water sources and 
room for social services such as schools, health centers, markets, and fertile land nearby also 
exists. 
IDP IN PRACTICE AND CHALLENGES 
While in Rwanda, research 
was conducted in IDP 
Munyinya in Muhanga 
District which had its initial 
groundbreaking in June 
2017.  This IDP, comprised 
of twelve ‘four in one’ type 
homes, was completely 
managed by the District and 
brought together landless, 
poverty level zero families 
from multiple cells in the 
area.  All of the 
approximately 50 residents 
of this IDP were genocide 
survivors, widows, orphans 
and/or disabled elderly 
couples.  While there, I had 
the opportunity to visit four 
different families in their 
homes, all of which had 
                                                
8 In many cases, IDP model villages are built using the Rwandan Armed Forces during their “service weeks” – a 
rotating shift of military units who work throughout the year.  International investors (often Chinese) were observed 
building roads to many of these settlements, but further research is required to determining who manages the actual 
building and project management of the IDP model villages. 
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moved into the IDP within the one to two months prior to my visit.  The homes each consisted of 
three bedrooms, a spacious living room, a wet room for showers, an indoor kitchen extended off 
of the house and an outdoor toilet with septic tank also outside of the main entrance of the house.  
Three of the four families were given their home with basic furniture provided. 
In my interviews with these families, I found that each of them reported being 
substantially better off than they had been prior to the move into the IDP and each reported 
decreased stress and overall increased wellbeing as a result of the move.  Each of the families 
also reported having spent the years since the genocide in very unstable living situations often 
rooming with friends, family members or in shacks in high risk zones where they were 
constantly harassed by landlords and unable to cover the cost of both food and rent frequently 
having to choose.  Many suffered obvious disabilities as a result of the genocide. 
  Construction of IDP Munyinya was still underway and each of the families had been 
relocated from different cells within the district in December 2017.  One of the challenges 
identified during this move came from their initial allocation of food and furniture as these 
resources were to come from their individual cell leadership.  The discrepancies of who was 
given what in terms of food, seeds, furniture etc. was identified as being a shortcoming of their 
originating cell leadership.  Each family was promised by district leadership that these supplies 
would be provided in the very near future but a few were skeptical about it ever being supplied at 
all.  One elderly couple was quoted saying “It is so much space to have three bedrooms for just 
the two of us. We have never had a consistent roof over our head without fear of having to leave.  
It is just very strange for us to have electricity but no food.  How do we survive in our nice 
house? The government continues to ask for patience.” (Interview conducted on January 4, 
2018).  They had been given cornflower, a few kilograms of rice and oil upon moving in, but 
were too elderly to work and continue to sustain themselves beyond the initial allocation. 
 Since this IDP was constructed on the outskirts of an existing umudugudu it didn’t 
require the traditionally included schools, health center etc. In fact, just down the hill from the 
IDP there was new construction of government employee barracks.  Many of the new IDP 
residents found themselves working at that site with stable jobs laying bricks and managing 
supplies making a living wage for the first time in their lives.  Priscilla, a woman in her mid-
30’s, managed the inventory as trucks brought materials to the construction site.  She was a 
resident of one of the ‘four in one’ IDP homes and lived with her mother and sister and had her 
own very tidy room for the first time in her life.  She said she had everything she needed and was 
happily supplying funds for food for her neighbors and had even helped find a number of the 
resident’s jobs building the government homes.  Missing from this IDP was the presence of an 
umudugudu leader, but when asked, was assured that since the IDP was still so new, the 









 In 2009, by way of the 
EDPRS, the government of Rwanda 
embarked on a policy that would 
address the inequalities of housing for 
the majority of the rural population.  
At the time, a large majority of rural 
homes had thatched roofs that were 
made of branches and mud and were 
quick to leak, collapse and required 
significant maintenance to keep the 
water of rainy season from 
penetrating the home.  A solution to 
this problem was the use of metal 
sheeting which is durable, lasts over 
20 years and are easy to use for water 
collection in the very wet climate. 
Though implementation of ubudehe, the government began a program in 2012 where metal 
sheets were distributed to the districts and then down to the cell leaders who then allocated the 
metal sheets to those people in the lowest ubudehe poverty category.  Based on interviews with 
the leader of a Rwanda-based NGO in Musanze, the sheeting was allocated in such a way that 
those who were the poorest would receive the tin roofs for free which would then incentivize 
those who could afford it to also purchase it.  Families who voluntarily moved into the 
umudugudu would also be guaranteed a tin roof as additional incentive to relocate.  Tin roofs 
today cost 7,000RWF (~$9 USD) per sheet and a family home of three bedrooms requires 
approximately 20 sheets to cover the home – total cost of $180 USD, a considerable but not 
unreasonable amount given that the average monthly income of a Rwandan is $900 USD.  Since 
2014, a significant increase of roofs have been distributed.  The alternative roof-type that is also 
widely accepted is the clay tile roof which can be observed much more widely in the eastern 
districts where clay soil is used as a more common building material for homes. 
The tin roof was in 
large an effort to raise the 
basic quality of life that 
even the poorest Rwandans 
could then enjoy.  In 
addition to a tin roof, it also 
became standard practice to 
ensure that each house also 
had a concrete floor rather 
than a dirt floor.  Houses of 
the families in the lowest 
level of ubudehe within the 
umudugudu, were given the provisions to upgrade their floor to concrete should they require it 
and those who were in a category that allowed for them to fund it themselves, were also required 
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to do so.  Efforts were also made during the monthly day of service, umuganda, to assist those 
who needed to upgrade their floor or their roof in order for everyone within the community to 
have the required infrastructure. 
Homes of this specification 
were observed across Rwanda. 
Additionally, only a small portion of 
homes with thatched roofs were also 
observed.  When asking village 
leaders how they enforced such 
upgrades to homes, their response was 
loosely that “people do not want to be 
different from their neighbors, and if 
given a roof for their home they 
would find a way to install it and if 
they were told it had to be done, very 
rarely did someone not work to 
accomplish it.” 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RURAL RESETTLEMENT AT UMUDUGUDU LEVEL 
 Umudugudu leadership plays one of the most pivotal roles in the distribution of 
government resources as well as the contributions to yearly imihigo. I spoke with the current and 
the former umudugudu leaders from Rwantonde, in Kirehe District which was an umudugudu 
that has been around since before the Genocide.  In 2006, with support from the sector, the 
village of approximately 130 homes decided that they were in desperate need of a health facility.  
At the time, the nearest facility was 37 kilometers away and much of village, as well as the rural 
scattered population, was unable to access basic health services.  With labor from the 
community, and funding from the district, and a number of local NGOs, a relatively large health 
clinic was built (Figure 13).  This health clinic became an anchor institution in the cell and in the 
years following, electricity, water, and roads were also constructed as the value of the hospital to 
the population increased. 






 Also since the completion 
of this hospital in 2012, the 
umudugudu leaders began to 
notice that “hill people” (a 
colloquial term used for scattered 
farmers up in the hill) began 
requesting permits to move into 
the umudugudu.  When asked the 
process of moving into the 
community, the leader stated that 
“they simply ask for a permit and 
then they are able to move into the 
area on a designated plot of land” 
(interview conducted Jan 5, 2018).  
Since the majority of these moves 
are from high-risk zones and 
conducted by people in severe poverty, the same process exists as discussed above.  The 
umudugudu leader confirmed their ubudehe category of poverty, and if they qualify, they are 
given a home and asked to destroy their existing home outside of the village or they are given a 
plot and asked to build their own home. 
 Upon completion of the hospital, the umudugudu leaders stated that the size of their 
village has expanded to over 200 homes as a result of the development that subsequently 
occurred in the village.  When the former umudugudu leader handed over his responsibilities to 
the new leader in 2013, there was approximately 30 percent of the umudugudu population in 
ubudehe categories one and two.  When I asked the village leader what the current percentage of 
his population that lived in the lowest categories of poverty was, he stated that it was less than 10 
percent, a 20 percent improvement over the past five years.  This could likely be attributed to the 
levels of social capital accessible in the umudugudu, as well as the improved housing structures 
and direct support of government resources allocated through the village leader. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RURAL RESETTLEMENT AT DISTRICT LEVEL 
 There are 30 Districts in Rwanda, each of them run by a District Mayor who is appointed 
by the President and held accountable for accomplishing his goals through the yearly imihigo 
process.  If at any time he is realized to not be effective, or accomplishes less than 50 percent of 
his yearly stated goals, the President can choose to remove him from office.  Because of this, the 
Mayor that I interviewed expressed a high level of anxiety surrounding the upcoming imihigo 
reports as the competition between each of the districts to outperform one another was high.  The 
mayor can serve two consecutive five year terms and this particular mayor ran a budget of 
approximately nine to 14 billion Rwandan Francs (10.5 to16.5 million dollars), for a population 
of approximately 360,000 people.  Much of his budget came from the central government with a 
lesser percentage coming in the form of the taxes imposed on his district’s residents. 
 Many of the Mayor’s goals revolved around poverty alleviation for the poorest residents. 
The 2015 ubudehe numbers he provided showed that 23.3 percent of his residents 
(approximately 84,000) lived in ubudehe poverty categories one and two.  His plan to target 
these categories and support them becoming financially stable include spending much of his 






funding on IDP Model Villages.  In January 2018, his district had completed three model 
villages, but with the funding in place and many of trial and error of the initial IDP’s out of the 
way, the District was on track to have 35 percent of its population residing in IDP model villages 
by 2024, specifically targeting the lowest ubudehe categories and those living in high risk zones. 
BENEFICIARIES AND CHALLENGES 
 While traveling through Musanze District in the northwest of the country in January, 
2018, I sat down with the head of a local NGO, PREFER, who was working closely with the 
umudugudu leaders to provide homes for some of the vulnerable populations who were living in 
nearby high-risk zones.  At that time, she had enough funding for the relocation of twenty 
families into a nearby village.  She reported that her NGO was funded mostly by donations and a 
yearly fund-raising effort in Canada and these funds were then put to use in partnership with the 
local cell leadership.  When proposing her project, the cell leadership, in consultation with the 
local umudugudu leadership, referenced the poverty classification rankings (ubudehe) for their 
cell and identified the 20 families who were lowest on the list.  These families included women 
headed households, widows, grown orphans who were survivors of the Genocide, families who 
lived in high-risk zones but were too poor to relocate and a number of handicap adults.  Each 
was required to take part in the building of their new homes, but without requirement to fund the 
materials or the additional labor that was needed.  The village, although small, already had a 
school and was at the end of a hard-packed dirt road.  In accordance with the housing standards 
put forth by the Rural Settlement Task Force, 20 homes were built, each had a solar panel for 
electricity and each had an outdoor toilet, a small 10m x 15m plot of land for basic farming and 
was in walking distance to their larger crop fields.   
I had the opportunity 
to sit down with ten of the 
adults who had moved into 
this village and they seemed 
genuinely pleased with their 
homes but still felt that they 
were lacking opportunities to 
jobs as the nearest large city 
was approximately five 
kilometers away.  When 
asked what additional 
improvements could be made 
to their personal living 
situations, they seemed to 
think that furniture should 
have been provided and that food was still scarce as many of the men felt a disincentive to 
continue making the trip to their fields.  Throughout the umudugudu in general, families were 
drying sorghum, cooking vegetables on outdoor fires (Figure 14).  The day I visited was also a 
holiday so there was a general relaxed feeling to the village and many of the men were at a 
nearby bar celebrating the holiday and the kids were not in school.  
Similar to my experience with the Genocide survivors in IDP Munyinya, residents that I 
spoke with informally all shared a common acceptance that life with in an umudugudu brought 





with it a certain level of stability and comfort as opposed to life on scattered farms with little 
access to social services.  In a conversation with the Housing Regulations Manager at the 
Rwanda Housing Authority, he stated that initially, the biggest challenge to resettlement was the 
cultural farming mindset of moving from a rural area into an umudugudu.  He stated that 
Rwanda is a culture of privacy and initially, people were very skeptical that they could live 
alongside other people and off of their family’s farm land.  Eventually, he said, with the 
environmental challenges, and the desire for education and medical access, the necessity of 
living in an umudugudu outweighed the concern of having less privacy.  As families slowly 
moved into the settlements, those who lived in scattered plots saw how their quality of lives 
changed.  They began to witness former neighbors move out of the lowest levels of poverty and 
into the communities with better homes, and access to education and medical care.  “Recently, I 
have been very impressed by how people came together to accept privacy concerns and are 
working forward together as Rwandans”. (Interview at RHA, Jan 3, 2018) 
REMAINING CHALLENGES 
Obviously, a program of this magnitude isn’t perfect.  When driving across the country, 
there are still many homes that are not part of an umudugudu settlement and farms are still 
scattered across the hills.  Although many of the families in these houses have not resettled in the 
physical sense, it seemed they have still reaped many of the benefits of the programs mentioned 
above.  Only very rarely was a home with a thatched roof observed (the vast majority were metal 
sheets - or clay tiles in the east) nor was a rural informal shack built in lieu of a house or formal 
structure (with the exception of Kigali, where informal settlements and shacks were frequently 
observed).   
Another challenge of the rural resettlement program is that although great strides have 
been made, Rwanda is still a country with less than a quarter of the population having regular 
access to electricity.  Although many of the poorest residents are being served, the relative level 
of poverty across the country is still great.  The same goes for access to more modern amenities 
such as a phone, television or a computer.  Although the progress being made across the country 
is significant, the pure difficulty of uprooting and relocating hundreds of thousands of families is 
something that will continue to take time.  Additionally, the ubudehe poverty category of two, 
the target goal for many of these initiatives, is still considerably poor.  
Finally, the scale at which the IDP Model Villages are being created is being far outpaced 
by the growing population.  The rush to move people into the Model Villages has created gaps in 
services for those who moved in prior to the settlement being ready for them.  As I sat down with 
the four families in the IDP created for genocide survivors, none of them had yet been allocated a 
plot of land or seeds to grow on it.  They were resettled once the houses were complete, but the 
provisions for them to feed themselves, have access to clean water, in some cases furniture and a 
plot of land, were yet to be funded or allocated.  This gap in services is a result of a hastily run 
program that may be trying too hard to show solid progress (potentially to meet imihigo 








REEVALUATION OF THESIS QUESTION AND CONCLUSION 
How does the Rwandan rural resettlement program address issues of accessibility and poverty 
reduction for its rural agrarian population? 
   
 Rwanda’s rural resettlement program is complex and ambitious but by and large has 
become a catalyst for providing services for its majority rural population partly by way of 
identifying and serving its most impoverish segment of society.  The systems and programs that 
are in place today are successfully targeting the individuals who most require social services and 
the program as a whole, is providing more than just roofs over heads, but also legal land tenure, 
education, improved health, and quality of life.  The success of this program, I argue, is largely 
rooted in the early efforts of creating a national strategy in Vision 2020.  This plan, cleverly 
coupled with the Home-Grown Solutions of tradition and culture, are directly addressing the 
issues of accessibility and poverty reduction through the resettlement process.  
It is increasingly acknowledged that homelessness involves more than just being without 
a house. Indeed, more recent definitions of what constitutes a home highlight the role of social 
connections and support (Johnstone, Parsell and Jetten, 2015).  The umudugudu program 
recognizes that poverty and homelessness cannot be alleviated without proper social support 
such as schools, markets, economic opportunity and access to healthy living and land tenure 
security.  Had Rwanda ignored the scattered populations and let them settle in high risk zones in 
shacks and without access to education or health centers, it would likely not be the growing 
economy that it is today.   In 2015, Rwanda was among the few African countries leading in the 
achievement of the MDGs especially in gender equality, women empowerment, universal 
primary education, child and maternal mortality, HIV prevalence, and environmental 
sustainability (MDG Monitor, 2015).  It is likely, that such strides would not have been made 
without the attention paid to the rural population throughout the rural resettlement program.  
Creating fully integrated umudugudu settlements and addressing the needs of the most 
vulnerable, the program is reducing poverty, acknowledging shelter as a human right and driving 
the economy to one of the strongest in Africa.  In the coming years and decades, other countries 
will begin to struggle with the realities their own returning refugee populations.  When this 
happens, Rwanda should be looked to as an example of how to manage land, housing, and social 
services through national strategies, land tenure laws and inclusive development practices with 











APPENDIX A – SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Local Resettled Population 
List of general questions that were asked in informal conversations with local population: 
     
1. Head of Household Status (Married, Widow, Female/male Headed Household) 
2. How long have you been living in *umudugudu name*? 
3. What year did you move to this umudugudu? 
4. What were the circumstances that brought you to this village? 
5. Where was your prior home (distance)? 
6. How many people live with you? 
7. Do you own/farm any land and how far away is it from your home? 
8. Who did you purchase/inherit the land from? 
9. How do you use your land? 
10. Do you have ownership of your home? 
11. Do you find living in a village to be a positive experience? 
 
Umudugudu Leaders 
General discussion topics addressed during informal conversations: 
 
1. What are the general demographics of your village population? 
2. What services does your village have (school, clinics etc)? 
3. When were those built and who built them? 
4. Have you noticed an increase of population since these services were built? 
5. How much of your population is in ubudehe category one? 
6. How often do you classify residents and what is the process like? 
7. Do you feel like you have adequate support from the cell and district leadership to 
continue to grow your village and assist your poorest population? 
8. What is the process for someone to move into the village from a nearby area? 
9. Do you think your number of ubudehe category one residents will increase or decrease in 















APPENDIX B - POLICIES 
 The policies implemented in the years following the creation of Rwanda Vision 2020 
play an integral role in the rural resettlement process.  Outlined below are the most crucial 
policies that supported the program and how they were implemented. 
 
Human Settlement Policy 
Until 1996, land in Rwanda was very politicized and had been managed at a macro level 
often with favorability given to those who were the same ethnicity of the party in power at the 
time.  In 1996, the government established the original National Human Settlement Policy in an 
effort to return much of the land to old case returnees while also accommodating the new case 
refugees.  This policy was the first step taken by the new government to begin working towards 
the housing crisis caused by the inflowing population, with specific steps being taken to relieve 
some of the structural poverty of households who were often homeless, poor and vulnerable as a 
result of years of conflict.  Those classified as vulnerable also included large numbers of 
widows, orphans and female heads of households, who following the genocide, lacked the ability 
to own or inherit land given their few legal rights as women or orphans. 
 Beyond accommodating the returning refugee population, there was guidance made by 
the initial Human Settlement Policy to also prohibit the building of houses outside of designated 
existing and proposed umudugudu areas.  The Cabinet at the time hoped this measure would 
result in better land use planning and the ability for a more focused effort of providing services.  
Also with the grouping of these settlements, there would be distinct lines between agriculture 
land and land for homes and communities of which the goal was to allow the land to realize the 
maximum potential for crop productivity. 
 This new Human Settlement Policy was much contested in the international community 
as historical attempts at villagization were often violent as authorities in Tanzania and Ethiopia 
were known to have forced people from their land and relocating them in different parts of the 
country.  However, according to the Rwandan Ministry of the Interior in 1997, “this form of 
settlement, in general, takes on a fundamental cultural dimension which is not necessarily 
transferable between countries. Rwanda cannot and should not base its rural development and 
settlement planning on comparison to other countries where similar programs have failed.” 
(MININTER, 1997) In later statements put out by the government, the government of Rwanda 
argued that the need for resettlement, unlike other countries, was a direct requirement stemming 
from the immense lack of housing and the significant need for preventing future social tensions. 
 An important aspect of this policy would be the ways in which the efforts of resettlement 
would be carried out.  According to van Leeuwen’s field research in 1998 (2001), there were 
initial issues with large international donors traveling to Kigali to view the Human Settlement 
Policy in action and these visits were reportedly precluded by rural farmers being bused into 
communities in an effort to show progress to potential donors.  The policy itself was also highly 
scientific and did not take into account the many areas of the country where communities already 
resided and how to reallocate land that was already claimed through inheritance but without 
official documentation of its original ownership.  Additionally, while this program was highly 
successful in housing the homeless population, there were residents who purportedly were 
unable to find land, or be allowed to claim land without first moving to an umudugudu.  





field work in 1998, it would also later become apparent 20 years later that many of those living 
in umudugudu, reported founding it necessary to do so in order to have access to the required 
social opportunities such as health and education. 
 In 2004 and again in 2009, the Human Settlement Policy was updated and adapted to 
meet the changing needs of the country and to continue to align to the strategic goals of the 
National Urbanization Policy of 2008, new building control regulations and updated economic 
development poverty strategies for 2008-2012.  According to the 2009 Human Settlement Policy 
(Rwanda Housing Authority, accessed Feb 27, 2018), the ministerial order n° 001/07.05 of May 
19, 2009 relating to the implementation of the national program on regrouped settlement defines 
settlements, umudugudu and rural area as follows: 
1. Settlement is a mode of human populating into groups of dwellings. This 
populating mode is distinguished by the measurement and physical aspect of the 
inhabited area and especially by the activities of the population. Therefore, there 
exist two kinds of settlement: rural and urban settlement.  
2. Umudugudu is defined as a mode of planned settlement made of between 100 and 
200 houses by site in rural areas. Measurements of plot reserved for umudugudu 
from 10 to 20 hectares with a possibility or capacity of extension and as far as 
possible a space provided for various nonagricultural activities so as to allow the 
population to earn their lives. The combination of all these elements constitutes 
the umudugudu.  
3. The rural area is defined by its geographical situation and activities that are 
carried out by its population based especially on agriculture and livestock. This 
rural area is characterized by a low number of houses which in general do not rise 
high, as well as roomy agricultural fields and pastures. These characteristics allow 
to differentiate between rural and urban areas.  
Moving forward, the Human Settlement Policy (with an updated draft to be released in the 
coming months) will continue to address increased land scarcity and the need to optimize 
productive land use.  The rural population will still be expected to live in organized clustered 
settlements, as the urbanization rate is expected to accelerate. The policy is expected to continue 
to free up more land for production, promote rational land use and facilitate cost effective service 
delivery to the population, such as infrastructure, education, security and agricultural extension, 












APPENDIX C - EDPRS 
 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy  
 
The program created to best 
track population, housing and 
poverty status across the country is 
the Economic Development and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(EDPRS), implemented in 2007.  
The EDPRS provides a framework 
for achieving the country’s long-
term development goals as outlined 
in Rwanda Vision 2020 and the UN 
Millennium Development Goals.  
The program focuses on four 
themes: growth, rural development, 
human development and 
governance.  At the onset of the 
EDPRS program, 90% of the poor population was rural and fell into the vulnerability categories 
of greatest destitution; widows, landless, sick, the elderly and child-headed households.  The 
initial survey conducted at the time of the program’s inception annotated that the largest drivers 
of poverty to be lack of land, poor soils, unpredictable weather and lack of livestock (IMF 
Report, 2010).  Since 2007, EDPRS surveys, known as the Integrated Household Living 
Conditions Survey (EICV) have been conducted in 2007, 2010, 2014 with another to be 
conducted in 2018.  This survey, with 
complete results posted on the 
Government of Rwanda Ministry of 
Statistics website shows exactly 
which populations are reporting what 
in terms of their consumption, 
standard of living and access to real 
assets.  Studying the poverty rates 
over time, the surveys show that 
Rwanda is making gradual progress 
on tackling poverty.  These results 
will be discussed later in the report as 
they are a key indicator for showing 





FIGURE 16 ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER BY CATEGORY  






APPENDIX D – LAND TENURE REFORM 
Land Tenure Regularization Program 
Land use planning and agricultural reform was arguably the most crucial early step of the 
government's efforts to resettle rural Rwanda.  Prior to the genocide, much of the land was 
owned by the State and the elite, and very few deeds or titles were accurate or held by the actual 
people working and living on the land.  The land was fragmented and as families grew, the 
amount of land parceled per person decreased below what was recommended as one hectare per 
person (Bizoza, 2011).  Until 2003, 90% of the country’s arable land was still governed by 
customary law while written land law applied only to a small number of persons and religious 
congregations. In 2003 there were an estimated 10 million plots of land that were unregistered 
(Deininger et al. 2011; Ali et al. 2014).  The new Land Tenure Regularization Program (LTR) 
provided a framework to ensure private land rights through secured land rights and effective land 
use and management that contribute to the country’s social and economic development 
(Deininger et al. 2011; Ali et al. 2014).  Under the LTR program, women were recognized as 
being legal land owners with the ability to inherit, purchase and sell land.  From 2005 to 
approximately 2012, LTR was decentralized to districts, sectors, cells and umudugudu where 
residents were then selected and trained to lead their communities in demarcating individual land 
plots using topographic maps, geospatial information systems (GIS), survey equipment and 
pictures with the national land through the National Land Center.  Levels of oversight were 
created at the sector and cell level where committees were established to sensitize the community 
about land laws, witness and confirm land transactions, implement LTR processes of 
demarcation, adjudication, dispute resolution and issuance of interim land certificates (Sagashya, 
2012).   
Consequently, the new LTR provided a framework to ensure private land rights through 
secured land rights and effective land use and management that contribute to the country’s social 
and economic development (Deininger et al. 2011; Ali et al. 2014).  From 2009 to 2013 the 
Rwanda Natural Resource Authority demarcated and issued land titles for approximately 10.04 
million parcels.  According to a study by the African Development Bank, the LTR was cost-
effective due to the large-scale involvement of local citizens, and the opportunity labor cost and 
employment of about 110,000 people, 99 percent of whom came from the communities in which 
the LTR was carried out. Employment of women was also high, where women filled 70% of 
staff field manager positions (Nkurunziza, 2015). With respect to implementing costs of the LTR 
program, estimates from the study by 
Nkurunziza (2015) show that each 
registered lease cost U.S. six dollars. This 
LTR has afforded Rwanda the 12th 
position globally on the registering 
property indicator of the World Bank’s 
Doing Business Report. Today, the 
current land tenure system in Rwanda 
continues to be the result of complex 
interactions between indigenous customs 
and the body of written land tenure 
regularization laws. 






APPENDIX E - LAW 
 
Excerpts of Current Law Governing Human Habitation  
N°20/2011 of 21/06/2011 is the overarching mandate in which all of the following policies and 
agencies abide by while moving forward with the resettlement of Rwanda’s scattered population. 
Relevant applications to rural settlement planning are as follows: 
Rural human settlements shall occupy spaces reserved for the construction of residences. 
Every residence shall be constructed in a group settlement site. (N°20/2011, Article 12) 
Without prejudice to agricultural, livestock and environmental protection activities, 
infrastructure and public buildings shall be erected in residential areas by taking into 
account the need to ensure easy access thereto by all users. (N°20/2011, Article 13) 
For the purposes of environmental protection, conservation and promotion, each rural 
human settlement shall be equipped with an adequate rainwater collection and drainage 
system that is in compliance with hygiene and sanitation legislation. (N°20/2011, Article 
14) 
Settlement operations that can be carried out in a rural areas shall consist of the 
identification of group settlement sites, land subdivisions, restructuring and replotting, 
rural renewal and real estate restoration (N°20/2011, Article 16)  
Land selected to serve as a group settlement site shall be subject to a land subdivision 
plan. The Rural Land Subdivision Plan shall indicate locations reserved for: construction 
of roads; routing of various networks; infrastructure; dumps; harvesting and treatment of 
rainwater and wastewater; any other public use facility.  (N°20/2011, Article 19) 
 
Housing Guidelines - Rural Settlement Task Force 
In the current housing guidelines as published by the Rural Settlement Task Force in 2011, the 
guidelines for houses constructed within umudugudu were as follows:  
a) Living house: A rural house of between 5-6 people should at least be of m2 56 with 
three bed rooms and a sitting room. It can be increased in size as means available. 
b) Kitchen: In order to have a sizable room for preparing meals, the size should at least be 
7.2 m2  
c) Store, Bathroom and Toilet. The store and bathroom should both be sizable, for 
purposes of cleanliness; every home should have a toilet with a depth of between 12- 20 





APPENDIX F – POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
Decentralization has been a key policy of the Government of 
Rwanda since 2000 when the National Decentralization Policy was adopted. 
The main thrust of the policy was, and is, to ensure equitable political, 
economic, and social development throughout the country, and to be a 
cornerstone of the fight against poverty by increasing people’s participation 
in the planning and management of the development process (MINALOC 
Decentralization Implementation Plan, 2011).  Today, the government 
hierarchy, outlined in figure 2, is the means in which information, resources 
and accountability are passed from the central government down to the 
village level.  This system is highly effective and the reason accurate 
reporting up and down the chain is so successful. 
Ministry of Infrastructure / Rwanda Housing Authority  
Under the institutional reform by the Government, different agencies 
were created as implementing institutions under the Ministry of 
Infrastructure (MININFRA). The Ministry of Infrastructure is responsible for 
the overall coordination of all sector stakeholders (Urbanization and Rural 
Settlement Sector, 2013). While overall, MININFRA is in charge of policy 
formulation and strategic planning, the Rwanda Housing Authority (RHA) was created to 
support to local development activities.  The RHA was established in November 2010 with the 
aim of restructuring and organizing urban development and the construction industries. The 
overall mission is “to implement the national housing and construction policy through 
coordination, conception, development, monitoring and evaluation of actions and programs set 
out in its mission”. (Rwanda Government Urbanization and Rural Settlement Sector Strategic 
Plan) 
Ministry of Local Administration (MINALOC) 
MINALOC interacts with the urbanization and human settlement sector through Districts 
and the City of Kigali for the implementation of imidugudu policy for sustainable land use 
management and access to the basic infrastructures. MINALOC gives support to vulnerable 
households without shelter through distribution of building materials and community works. This 
Ministry supports the sector to collect data available on the “imidugudu” built in rural area, and 
to identify housing needs (Rwanda Government Urbanization and Rural Settlement Sector 
Strategic Plan). 
The Rural Settlements Task Force (RSTF) is the action arm of MINALOC particularly 
linking themselves to the rural communities and supporting imidugudu development. While 
RHA is responsible for planning, the RSTF facilitates implementation of imidugudu creation and 
expansion.  In the past, imidugudu focused on grouping households to better be able to reach 
them with services. The services are, however, still lacking in many places and the villages are 
too small to offer socio-economic viability.  Therefore, the RSTF is currently working with 
sector leaders on layout plans to provide infrastructure, services and amenities in the majority of 
imidugudu settlements. The long-term intention of the Task Force then is to ultimately upgrade 
all rural settlements into integrated villages, providing opportunities for improved rural 
livelihood. Eventually, the dispersed umudugudu locations will form a type of mixed use trading 
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